Disparitas Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Tentang Model Keserentakan Pemilu

The Disparity Of The Constitutional Court Decision Regarding The Simultaneous Election Model

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) Nomor 135/PUU-XXII/2024 telah mengubah desain keserentakan pemilihan umum di Indonesia secara fundamental dengan memisahkan jadwal pemilu nasional dan daerah. Putusan ini memicu perdebatan ketatanegaraan yang serius karena pada Putusan Nomor 55/PUU-XVII/2019, MK sebelumnya menyatakan bahwa penentuan model pemilu merupakan ranah kebijakan hukum terbuka pembentuk undang-undang. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis disparitas putusan MK tersebut dari perspektif batas open legal policy, kualitas argumentasi hukum yang mendasarinya, serta dampaknya terhadap sistem ketatanegaraan. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan konseptual. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa: Pertama, MK menunjukkan disparitas sikap yang berujung tindakan melampaui kewenangannya dengan mengambil alih ranah legislatif dan memosisikan diri sebagai pembuat norma. Kedua, Pertimbangan hukum Mahkamah dibangun bukan atas argumentasi non hukum yang masih perlu penelitian lebih lanjut seperti efisiensi beban kerja kelembagaan dan kejenuhan pemilih bukan berpijak pada murni persoalan inkonstitusionalitas norma. Ketiga, putusan ini melahirkan paradoks partisipasi bermakna, di mana MK merampas wewenang DPR dengan dalih minimnya partisipasi publik, namun MK memutus desain pemilu secara sepihak di ruang tertutup dan melanggar pilar Hak untuk didengar dengan mengabaikan keterangan Presiden dan DPR di persidangan. *Keempat*, pengabaian tersebut bermuara pada krisis tata negara di masa transisi yang berpotensi memicu kekosongan jabatan secara masif di ratusan daerah pada periode 2029–2031. Penelitian ini merekomendasikan agar MK kembali memegang teguh prinsip sikap menahan diri serta mendorong DPR dan Pemerintah untuk segera merumuskan rekayasa mitigasi transisi melalui revisi undang-undang kepemiluan yang inklusif dan partisipatif.

Constitutional Court (MK) Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024 has fundamentally altered the design of simultaneous elections in Indonesia by separating the national and regional election schedules. This decision has triggered serious constitutional debate, since in Decision Number 55/PUU-XVII/2019, the MK had previously stated that determining the election model falls within the open legal policy domain of the legislature. This study aims to analyze the disparity in these MK rulings from the perspective of the limits of open legal policy, the quality of the underlying legal argumentation, and its impact on the constitutional system. The research method used is normative juridical, employing statutory and conceptual approaches. The results show that: First, the MK exhibited a disparity in stance that led it to act beyond its authority by usurping the legislative domain and positioning itself as a norm-maker. Second, the Court's legal reasoning was built not on legal argumentation but on non-legal considerations that still require further research, such as institutional workload efficiency and voter fatigue, rather than being grounded purely in issues of the unconstitutionality of the norm. Third, this ruling gives rise to a paradox of meaningful participation, in which the MK stripped the House of Representatives (DPR) of its authority under the pretext of insufficient public participation, yet the MK itself decided the election design unilaterally behind closed doors and violated the pillar of the right to be heard by disregarding the statements of the President and the DPR during the hearing. Fourth, this disregard culminates in a state-administration crisis during the transition period, with the potential to trigger a massive vacuum of leadership positions across hundreds of regions during the 2029–2031 period. This study recommends that the MK once again uphold the principle of judicial restraint, and urges the DPR and the Government to promptly formulate transitional mitigation measures through an inclusive and participatory revision of election legislation.